

## A PASSING COMMENT ON ΔΟΚΕΩ AND ARCHILOCHUS:

P. COLON. INV. 7511

The Cologne Epode is surely no outstandingly elegant or particularly moving fragment of poetry. Nor is it clear whether it was composed by Archilochus or some later imitator, although I suspect, given the present climate of scholarly opinion, a kind of happy thought opts for the earlier date. The poem's detractors have, however, overlooked a certain linguistic subtlety that makes it more possibly early lyric and certainly more interesting than they suspect. To speak in brief: the issue lies about the usage of δοκέω in line four.

The girl is addressing the male protagonist of the fragment and seems to be suggesting a substitute for herself: δοκέω δέ μιν]/ εἶδος ἄμωμον ἔχειν—And δοκέω that she has a blameless form». Bossi has already cited Homeric and Hesiodic examples to secure εἶδος ἄμωμον ἔχειν (*Od.* 4.14, *Hes. Th.* 908, see 259)<sup>1</sup>. What exactly, however, is the tone of δοκέω? Marcovich translates it as «I would say»<sup>2</sup>; Degani, «a mio parere»<sup>3</sup>; Ebert and Luppe, «ich glaube»<sup>4</sup>; van Sickle, «I think»<sup>5</sup>. What does *she* say? Only Gelzer—and he to deny Archilochean authorship—has centered any protracted attention on δοκέω<sup>6</sup>, and it was these remarks that first indicated to me that the fragment at this point might warrant further consideration.

Gelzer argues against epic usage, seeing in the word a «polite restriction of statement as often is found in attic dialogue («...als höfliche Einschränkung der Aussage, wie oft im attischen Dialog» 22)<sup>7</sup>. His considerations are predicated on certain statistical facts. He declares that in 26 out of 29 instances in epic (*Iliad*, *Odyssey*, *Homeric Hymns*) 'scheinen' means δοκεῖν, otherwise the meaning is 'meinen' («in the pointed sense of 'expect' (H 192), 'erroneously suppose' (σ 382), 'believe' in opposition to 'know' (*Hy. Merc.* 208)). In lyric from Archilochus to Pindar, he declares that the stress is upon a subjective 'Meinen'

1. F. Bossi, «Note al nuovo Archiloco», *M Cr* 8/9 1973–1974, 15, see also B. Marzullo, «Note al nuove Archiloco», *M Cr* 8/9 (1974–1974), 37–38.

2. M. Marcovich, «A New Poem of Archilochus: P. Colon. inv. 7511», *GRBS* 16. (1975), 2.

3. E. Degani, «Il nuove Archiloco», *A & R* 19 (1974), 117.

4. J. Ebert and W. Luppe, «Zum neuen Archilochos—Papyrus», *ZPE* 16 (1975), 224.

5. J. van Sickle, «Archilochus: A New Fragment of and Epode», *CJ* 7 (1975), 1.

6. It is interesting that so searing a critic against authenticity as Marzullo does not examine δοκέω but argue that in the line itself «la struttura è tuttavia tradizionale», citing *H. Merc.* 208, παῖδα δ' ἔδοξα ... σαρπες δ' οὐκ οἶδα, νοῆσαι; as proof, although, to be sure, as far as the line in the fragment is concerned, he throws up his hands in view of the «weak style»: «Malgrado il sia sospetto. è di qui che lo scialbo stilema discende nel nostro carme: quale che se ne voglia immaginare l'età»—Marzullo, *loc. cit.*, 37–38.

7. T. Gelzer, «Archilochus und der neue Kölner Papyrus», *MH* 82 (1975). 21–22.

versus an objective 'Scheinen'. «Throughout this, 'Meinen' expresses an uncertainty of recognition or the personal focus of judgements from established suspicion to the full misjudgment of reality» (Überall drückt dieses 'Meinen' die Unsicherheit der Erkennens oder die persönliche Einstellung beim Urteilen, vom begründeten Ahnen bis zum völlige Verkennen der Wirklichkeit, aus) <sup>8</sup>. Gelzer's instinct in this matter is correct, i.e., the 'subjective—objective' grid is useful, and it should be applied to the fragment at hand in order to test its tone and perhaps even its authenticity, but there is a confusion caused by his explication of the philological disjunction and also because of his insistence that his 'subjective' usage must be lyric and not epic. One reason is, I think, because he writes in German; the other is because he does not perceive the essential archaic polarity between 'seeming' and 'appearing'.

German lacks a clear distinction in vocabulary and usage between 'seeming' and 'appearing' in the sense of 'subjective uncertainty' versus 'objective clarity'. 'Scheinen' is employed for both 'to seem' and 'to appear', although 'er-scheinen' usually describes a more exterior state. Hence when Gelzer states that «'scheinen' bedeutet δοκεῖν im alten Epos», it is difficult to tell what he means, especially when he continues by drawing an Homeric distinction between «objective 'Scheinen'» and «subjective 'Meinen'» <sup>9</sup>. Are we now to consider the Homeric δοκεῖν primarily 'objective' and therefore somehow impinging on the subject or somehow constituted from without? The evidence I shall soon advance argues against this position. No, on this point the German is confusing by its very nature, but the linguistic inadequacy would be of no importance if Gelzer had sensed the polarity between φαίνεσθαι and δοκεῖν in ancient Greek <sup>10</sup> and realized that, on any pos-

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8. Gelzer lists the lyric examples of the Homeric 'subjective—objective' possibilities in fn. 28: «Weiterführung derselben Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten wie bei Homer. Von 51 Belegen 5 zu fragmentarisch, 28 'objektives' 'Scheinen', 18 'subjektives' 'Meinen' in der spezifischen Bedeutung von 'erwarten' (wahnhaft oder begründet): Sol. 34, 2.4 (West); Sem. 1, 9; Theogn. 137. 138. 552; Bacch. fr. 29 B 12 Sn.; Pind. Nem. 7, 31; 'wähnen': Sol. 13, 39. 42; Theogn. 201, 221, 1315. 1381; Xenop. 12, 1 D.<sup>3</sup>; Anacr. 417, 2 Page; betont 'persönliches Meinen': Anan. 5, 9; Bacch. Dith. 18, 12».

9. It is questionable, in my opinion, whether 'Meinen' or any related word can properly be employed to translate δοκεῖν, since it implies in German a mental activity coupled with personal will (cf. 'meiner Meinung nach') that some would not like seen applied to Homeric 'thinking'. Cf. B. Snell, «Wie die Griechen lernten, was geistige Tätigkeit ist», *JHS* 93 (1975), 172—184.

10. P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris, 1968), p. 290, makes note of this opposition in his article on δοκέω which he defines as «parfois 'sembler' par opposition à φαίνεσθαι 'être évident'». The strongest argument to date lies in Georges Redard's «Du grec δέχομαι 'je reçois' au sanskrit átha - 'manteau'. Sens de la racine \*dek-», *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung: Festschrift Albert Debrunner* (Bern, 1954), pp. 353—354: «Le sens de 'sembler, paraître' qu'on attribue communément à δοκέω peut être précisé si l'on considère certains emplois techniques du verbe et, d'autre part, en l'opposant à celui du prétendu synonyme φαίνεσθαι». Of the earlier examples of this polarity, he cites *Il.* 7. 192, δοκέω νικησέμεν «je crois pouvoir vaincre» and continues to remark, «C'est par ce trait fondamental que δοκεῖ μοι 'il me semble, après réflexion' se distingue de φαίνεται μοι 'il me paraît, d'après ce que je puis voir conformément à une apparence qui s'impose à moi de l'extérieur'», citing *Il.* 6. 338 and *Od.* 16. 25 as evidence.

sible philological grid of 'objective-subjective', it is the former, 'to appear from without', that is objective and the latter, 'to seem from within', that is subjective. What we must ask is what kind of 'subjective' experience δοκῆν implies. This is easily accomplished by looking at the evidence in Homer. As Gelzer notes, the examples are twenty-nine. The word is, hence, not frequent in the corpus.

Δοκέω in Homer is primarily a 'sight word', that is, it describes a way a person sees and hence the way an object 'seems'. Etymologically the most important connection is, I believe, with δοκεύω, 'to keep an eye on' <sup>11</sup>, e.g., the constellation of the Wain «keeping its eye on Orion» (Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει—*Il.* 18.489), a man «keeping his eye on the leading man» in a horse race (προϋχοντα δοκεύει—*Il.* 23.325), or a man «having kept his eye on the enemy» (δοκεύσας) as a preface to slaughter (*Il.* 13.545, see also 8.340 and 16.313). This inner, yet outwardly-directed intension of sight is part and parcel of the Homeric δοκέω, except several degrees more intense and certainly more sure.

Δοκεύω tends to describe a calculating gaze; δοκέω reflects a more hidden and decidedly more complicated inwardness. It is, for instance, opposed to οἶδα: «I seemed, sir, to have applied my νόος to a child, *but* I do not know certainly» (παῖδα δ' ἔδοξα φέριστε, σαρῆς δ' οὐκ οἶδα, νοῆσαι *Hy. Merc.* 208) The sight is obscured and only vaguely transmitted through the νόος. See also *Il.* 9.103–105 where the noetic language in conjunction with μοι δοκεῖ is obsessive. Nestor is forcibly projecting his particular νόος out among the assembly: «I speak as it seems best to me (ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα), for no other man noetically will apply his νόος (νόον νοῆσει) better than this—a νόος such as I apply (οἶον ἐγὼ νοέω)». The projection of intent is outward in this case and clearly positive, as it is generally with such phrases in Homer as δοκεῖ μοι ἄριστα, δοκεῖ μοι ἄμεινον, and δοκεῖ μοι λῶτον (cf. *Il.* 6.338–339, *Od.* 1.376, 2.141, 5.360, 13.154, 23.124–130, *et al.*). It is in these projections intensified by the participation of the subject (μοι) <sup>12</sup> that the sharp, visually—focused power of δοκεύειν is

11. I do not ignore the long-established relationship between δοκέω and δέχεσθαι, 'to receive in exchange for' (H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1960), I. 405–406, also 373; Chantraine, *op. cit.*, p. 291), but again I should argue that the major factor involved is that of sight. e.g., in δορός, 'a bearing beam' in the roof or floor of a house (*Il.* 17.744; *Od.* 19.78 and 22.176). Insofar as δέχομαι maintains the modern translation of 'to accept' I should suggest that it partakes largely of a *ritual* form of acceptance—that is, a kind of ritualistic gesture, inwardly derived, of an approach to any object. This is especially well seen in sanskrit dāsti. Cf. G. Redard, *loc. cit.*, p. 352: «En sanskrit, on a principalement dāsti (aussi dāśati, dāśnoti) 'il honore, il fait offrande, sacrifice à' et, avec le theme eu-s- du lat. decus, dāsasyati 'il cherche à plaire, il sert, il honore' (see also pp. 360–362). Δέχομαι is found to possess a relationship to the laws of hospitality (*Il.* 18.331, *Od.* 17.110) and is hence linked with the *gesture* of acceptance: «Enfin tant l'étymologie que la sémantique engagent à ranger aux côtes de δέχομαι les présents à redoublement δειδίσκομαι 'faire un signe de bienvenue, saluer de la main' (δεξιτερῇ χειρὶ *Od.* 20.197....)» See also *Il.* 22.434 (355). In their relationship to δοκέω both δοκεύω and δέχεσθαι, however, possess a common denominator in a certain linear 'geometry of sight' that implies the acceptance of a 'line' or object in terms of the way one sees and consequently reacts.

12. The 'subjective' power of this phrase was observed in the last century: J. Classen, *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1847),

most evident. Δοκέω becomes a powerful connection between what a person might hold within and what he desires to project upon an outer, more 'objective' world.

Yet—and this is particularly to our purpose in the case of the Cologne fragment—δοκέω is certainly not always so positive in its outward projection. What 'seems best' to a man does not necessarily, even for all his personal assuredness, have to be 'best' at all. In *Iliad Twelve* Polydamas speaks out to Hektor what 'seems best' to him (ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα); Hektor is not pleased (*Il.* 12. 215 & 230). In *Iliad Thirteen*, however, Polydamas speaks ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα and Hektor is pleased (*Il.* 13.735 & 747). The subjective projection or intent, fully inner in formulation, may be declared useful or not once it reaches the outside world. What it is is a kind of tentative guess or 'look at' some situation. This is why one sees a connection between this action and the θυμός: In *Odyssey Twenty*, for instance, the hero hears Penelope weeping, and in his musings (μερμηρίζε) he seemed in his θυμός (δόκησε οἱ κατὰ θυμόν) that she knew him and was standing by (*Od.* 20.93—94). She is *not* standing by. Or, even more important for our purposes in reviewing the Cologne fragment, take *Il.* 7. 191—192 where the only instance of δοκεῖν in the first singular occurs<sup>13</sup> and, like unto the Cologne construction of δοκέω ἔχειν, we possess an occurrence of δοκέω with the infinitive<sup>14</sup>, Ajax has just drawn the lot to fight Hector, and he is elated because of the opportunity: «—even myself—rejoice in my θυμός (χαίρω θυμῷ), «states he», since it seems to me that I shall conquer god-like Hektor (δοκέω νικησέμεν Ἑκτορα δῖον). Of course, he does *not*.

It is this 'subjective' possibility of being totally wrong that lies inherent in δοκέω and permits its usage in the *Odyssey* in situations of hidden threat or irony: Telemachus tells the suitors that if it seems best to them (ὅμῶν δοκέει) to waste his substance, to go ahead (*Od.* 1.376, see also 2.141)—they will die for it (unstated). Athene in the guise of Mentor in the same book is talking to Telemachus; «[Ah]», says she, «the suitors seem to be (δοκέουσι) feasting in your halls with outrage and overweening» (*Od.* 1.227—228)—they will not for much longer (unstated). Or take the excellent example of the scene in which Eurymachus jeers at Odysseus: «Nevertheless it seems to me (μοι δοκέει)», states he with an obvious unawareness of the true situation, «that the ray of the torches comes from him—from his head, since there is not a trace of hair

p. 198: «...selbst auf der niederen Stufe des flüchtigen Dafürhaltens tritt im Griechischen die höhere Stellung des Subjectes deutlich hervor: δοκεῖ τί μοι, es bietet sich der Gegenstand meiner Auffassung dar ...».

13. Considerable attention should be given to the importance of person and number as indication of specific nuances of meaning. Snell has made a good beginning on this investigation in his *Aufbau der Sprache* (Hamburg, 1952), and one should give heed to his description of the first singular as a 'model of my purpose' (100) and its predilection for the future since «Die Zukunft dagegen ist die Zeit meines Wirkens» (104). In both *Il.* 7.192 and in the Cologne fragment, the clear relationship to the future designates, I should think, just this kind of projected, subjective intent.

14. Cf. W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (London, 1900), p. 312 on *Il.* 7.192: «δοκέω, to think, with infin., seems to occur only here in Homer». He continues, however, with a most interesting comment: «but σ 382 [καὶ πού τις δοκέεις μέγας ἕμμεναι—*you think yourself to be some great man*] shews the transitional state 'to seem to one's self'. This is the sense of Gelzer's 'erroneously suppose' (21) and is, I think, indicative of the general subjective stance taken in the Cologne Epode as a whole.

thereon» (*Od.* 18.354–355). This is good Homeric irony. Eurymachus speaks from a tracherously confused inner region, and he speaks with conviction. He cannot see the light that emanates from Odysseus and is wholly blind. Odysseus awaits in ambush—the pattern of sight is for him that of *δοκέω*—and this ambush is ‘reflected’ by the suitor’s black depth of seeming (*δοκέω*). So deep within, *δοκεῖν* in Homer is covered and the convenient butt of irony and misunderstanding.

Now, in light of this ironic Homeric usage, let us once again return to the Cologne Epode. The general structure of the poem, as we have it, is a give and take between the male protagonist and the girl. She suggests to her future lover that a substitute for herself is at hand. There is no evidence I can see for her advancing here or elsewhere some kind of chaste and formal argument for some ‘old moral code’ as van Sickle would have us believe<sup>15</sup>. She simply states, *δοκέω δέ μ[ν] / εἶδος ἄμωμον ἔχειν*, «And *δοκέω* that she has a blameless form». What is the Homeric and hence possibly lyric nuance? One should not disregard any especial meaning whatsoever and argue that the girl is merely advancing an alternative. A more interesting possibility seems to be at hand, and this involves the male protagonist’s knowledge of what *δοκέω* signifies. Could the girl be expressing herself somewhat in the following manner to him: «Oh, I’m not sure, but if I were to take a look at the girl, I’d think you’d find her exquisite—oh, you may find me wrong». The man in that brusque aggressiveness that is typically Archiloean<sup>16</sup> immediately perceives the irony; «Yes», thinks he, «you ‘think’ you want me to take another but your blind little game fools me not at all. You’ll soon find that I’m to be your lover—and quickly too». He goes along with her game for a bit and proceeds then to a seduction. I should be noted that the girl at *no point* puts up further obstruction. Did she ever? If so, it was very weak, as the *δοκέω* signifies. In fact it is so weak and so easily ironic that one constantly returns to the possibility of whether she has her heart in her seeming objections at all<sup>17</sup>. Neither what we have of her words nor the conse-

15. Van Sickle, *loc. cit.* 5.

16. It is well known that Archilochus was no courtly lover. In fact H. Fränkel is correct, I believe, in stating that «Wenn Archilochos Mädchen preist, sind es vermutlich immer Hetären», *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (München, 1962), p. 161. The women of his acquaintance never resist his advances. This poem presents no necessary exception.

17. Snell in private conversation has confided that he believes the lover’s reference to the mother in line seven [*Ἀμφιμεδοῦς θυγάτηρ*] is best explained as part of an elaborate game between the lover and the girl: the sister is endeavoring to pass herself off as Neobule in order to plead her own case. She is in some way hidden—perhaps by darkness. The lover is not fooled but plays the game, even to the point of attacking Neobule (11.16–23). The «daughter of the mother» becomes a clever device that allows the girl at that point to believe her ruse has been successful. Of course, which of the two daughters the poet-lover has designated by the phrase is purposely obscure. Snell’s interpretation is, I think, plausible. What is interesting, of course, is that it is in accord with the contention that the poem is a straight piece of seduction in which the male protagonist knows the weakness of the female, that the female puts no real credence in her suggestion that he make love to another than herself as she stands before him, and that her *δοκέω* is indeed a thing of hidden meaning, a tentative utterance of a confusing spirit who might even half self-consciously be speaking with irony—with an irony, in any case, that the male protagonist immediately senses and uses.

quent action of the fragment indicates such resolution. The Homeric δοκέω, I think, makes the poem a bit more subtly involved and certainly more aggressively masculine than most have thought to date.

## Π Ε Ρ Ι Λ Η Ψ Ι Σ

Εἰς τὸ ἄρθρον ἀποσαφηνίζεται ἐπὶ τῇ βάσει παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν Ἐπῶν καὶ Ὑμνων ἡ διπλῇ σημασία τοῦ δοκέω : 1) ἡ ἀντικειμενική, βάσει ἔξωθεν πειστικῶν στοιχείων μὲ τὴν σημασίαν être evident, εἶναι φανερόν καὶ 2) ἡ ὑποκειμενική, μὲ προβολὴν ἔσωθεν διαθέσεως, il me semble, νομίζω, ὅπου δὲν ἀποκλείεται ἡ σύνδεσις μὲ αἰσθήματα κινδύνου (ἀπειλῆς) ἢ εἰρωνείας.

Εἰς τὸ ἐνταῦθα συζητούμενον δοκέω ἔχειν τοῦ PCologne τὸ ἄρθρον εὕρισκει τὴν ὑποκειμενικότητα τῆς ἀναλόγου ἐκφράσεως τοῦ Λίαντος. Ἰλ. Η 191 δοκέω νικησέμεν, ἀλλὰ μὲ προφανῇ διάθεσιν εἰρωνείας.

## Ν Ε Α Ι Ε Κ Δ Ο Σ Ε Ι Σ

Γ Ε Ω Ρ Γ Ι Ο Υ Α . Π Α Π Α Ν Τ Ω Ν Ι Ο Υ

Κ α θ η γ η τ ο ῦ Π α ν ε π ι σ τ η μ ί ο υ

ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ

Τ Ο Μ Ο Ι Τ Ε Σ Σ Α Ρ Ε Σ

— ● —  
Πωλεῖται εἰς κεντρικὰ βιβλιοπωλεῖα