

εἰς τὴν προσωπικότητά του καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀντίληψίν του διὰ τὸ ἔργον του μὲ λόγον οἰκειότητος, μὲ λόγον καθημερινόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγον κλασσικόν καὶ στίλβοντα καὶ ἀκόμη μὲ λεξιλόγιον τοῦ περιβάλλοντός του δυνάμενον νὰ ἀρέσκη εἰς τοὺς ἀναγνώστας τοῦ κύκλου του πρὸς οὐς ἀπευθύνεται. Ἐὰν συγκριθῇ πρὸς ἄλλους σατιρικούς, τὸν Πέρσιον καὶ Ἰουβενάλιον, ἡ γλῶσσα τοῦ Οὐ. εἶναι περισσότερον φυσική, ἢ δὲ γλῶσσα τῶν Σατιρῶν του διαφέρει τῆς τῶν ἄλλων, διδακτικῆς μᾶλλον φύσεως ἔργων του.

Αἱ διαπιστώσεις τοῦ βιβλίου, προῖδν μακρᾶς μελέτης καὶ λεπτομεροῦς ἀναλύσεως, στηριχθείσης εἰς ἀφθονα ἀποδεικτικὰ στοιχεῖα, μαρτυροῦν τὸν ζῆλον, τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν μεθοδικότητα τῆς σ. ἢ ὅποια οἰκειωθεῖσα τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ Οὐαρρωνείου λόγου εἰς βάθος ἠδυνήθη νὰ προσφέρῃ νέαν ἀξιόλογον μορφήν τοῦ κειμένου τῶν Σατιρῶν μὲ πλουσίαν τὴν ἰδιάν της ἀτομικὴν εἰσφορὰν καὶ νὰ ἀποδείξῃ τὸν ἀληθῆ χαρακτήρα τῆς γλώσσης τοῦ ἐκλεκτοῦ τούτου τέκνου τῆς Ρώμης, τὸ ὅποῖον εἶχε τὴν σπανίαν ἱκανοποίησιν νὰ ἴδῃ ζῶν ἰδρῦόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν συγχρόνων του τὸν ἀνδριάντα του.

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ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ Ν. ΚΟΥΤΡΑ, Ἡ κοινωνικὴ ἠθικὴ τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνους :
Αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς φιλίας, Ἀθήναι, 1973, σσ. XII+189.

The rising interest in Aristotle's political and ethical thought during the past decade makes the present study a timely contribution toward the critical evaluation and assessment of classical theories of social ethics. The author has worked out a detailed analysis of the place and significance of the virtues of justice and friendship in Aristotle's systematic treatment of social ethics. While developing his theme he also offers a number of illuminating comments on the difference between the ancient and modern social structures as well critical contrasts between classical and modern philosophers on the nature of ethical problems and the respective conceptions of method.

Koutras states in the Preface what appears to be one of his guiding principles: «The basic features, the properties and problems of social ethics that concern human beings as citizens remain the same, regardless of particular circumstances». This statement is not without some initial difficulty. As the discussion progresses the reader sees more fully why the author argues along Aristotelian lines in favor of man's unchanging nature. His sympathies with Aristotle go even further than that.

Koutras asserts that Aristotle's social philosophy not only marks an advance over the views of his predecessors, including Plato, but on the whole reflects more adequately the fundamental structure of organized life in the *polis*. While it should be admitted that the domain of ethics for both Plato and Aristotle cannot be understood apart from the wider context of social and political life, since it is here that man forms and shapes his *ethos*, Aristotle found it necessary to criticize Plato's theory of Forms in order to free his views from a transcendent philosophy of ethics and base his system on the finite nature of the individual man. As the author points out, Aristotle relies on the virtues of *phronesis* and *proairesis* as the principles that determine human action, (*prattein*). Yet, it is the virtues of justice and friendship that constitute the binding elements of social

ethics. Koutras sees that the difference between Plato and Aristotle on this issue can be formulated as follows: whereas Plato stresses the priority of justice, Aristotle considers it to be the precondition of *philia* and thus assigns to friendship a central role in all social relations.

The first two chapters are more general and are designed to introduce the reader to Aristotle's method and conception of ethics, on the one hand, and their place in the history of Greek thought and political developments, on the other. The remaining three chapters treat in detail the substantive and complex issues that surround the concepts of justice and friendship in Aristotle, with frequent references to pre-Aristotelian and post-classical positions. The intent throughout the author's sustained discussion is to exhibit the basic thrust of Aristotle's social ethics by showing how all the related virtues and actions converge on securing the highest goal of men as individuals and as citizens: *eudaimonia*, the moral and intellectual perfection of the members of any organized society in a spirit of freedom through justice and friendship.

In presenting his analysis of this difficult subject, Koutras shows impressive familiarity with the original texts, advances sound arguments to support his exegesis and succeeds in keeping in the foreground the fundamentally naturalistic, humanistic and political character of Aristotle's ethical philosophy. He is on solid ground here. However, it seems rather curious that, given Koutras' approach and special emphasis on the Aristotelian principle of *eudaimonia* as the highest end of man and as founded on the nature of man, he did not supplement his discussion with a concentrated analysis of Aristotle's psychological treatises and the *De Anima*, in particular. He occasionally refers to this latter work but only in passing. Thus he missed what seems to this reader the needed testimonies to strengthen his central thesis and round up the argument. No doubt such an undertaking would have required the writing of an additional lengthy chapter. The resultant weakness made possible what in one connection must be regarded as questionable interpretation.

By relying on passages from *Metaphysics* to elucidate the Aristotle views on the hierarchical organization of goals, Koutras is led to conclude that Aristotle created a «chasm» between the goals of the theoretical life, on one hand, and those of political and practical life, on the other. Thus, he states (p. 33): «Although ἡ νόησις νοήσεως is the highest purpose of man, man as a political animal is drawn by the society of his fellow human beings toward the goal of community life in search of *eudaimonia*. Hence we see in the philosophy of Aristotle a great chasm between these two sides...». In favor of his interpretation he cites two passages, which he believes support the above contention: (a) *Met.* A9, 1094 b 34, and (b) *Nic. Eth.* K8, 1178 a 9—b 32, 1178 b 33—1179 a 32.

The contention is based on a forced correlation of passages that do not seem directly related to the issue. In the first place, there is nothing in the *Metaphysics* passage stating that νόησις νοήσεως is «the highest purpose of man». As for the passage from the *Nic. Eth.*, the main topic it explores has to do with the ways in which divine life differs from human *eudaimonia* especially as regards the exercise of the faculty of *nous*; nowhere do we find here the expression νόησις νοήσεως. Therefore, Koutras' inference has no textual basis in the *Nic. Ethics*. Furthermore, we have Aristotle's explicit statement in *Nic. Eth.* Bk. A, Ch. 1, to the effect that (a) ethics is a chapter of politics, and (b) the ends of our actions must be of the attainable kind. The claim that νόησις νοήσεως belongs

to this kind is a highly debatable issue. Therefore, to support his charge of a chasm would require Koutras to come up with stronger evidence. So long as Koutras insists on this charge, he must face another problem, an equally complex issue: he needs to show that Aristotle's two celebrated statements, viz. that man is by nature a political animal and a theoretical animal, cannot constitute a consistent set.

Although the above issue does not figure largely in Koutras' otherwise able discussion, the reader will find much in this book that is genuinely informative. The book is in many respects helpful towards understanding not only Aristotle's position on social ethics but also how his philosophical treatment of this vital area still constitutes a viable alternative in the face of the puzzles that confront contemporary man.

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ΑΝΤΩΝΙΟΥ ΣΙΓΑΛΑ, Καθηγητοῦ Πανεπιστημίου, *Ἱστορία τῆς ἑλληνικῆς γραφῆς. Μετὰ Εἰσαγωγῆς. Πρόδρομοι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῆς γραφῆς*. Δευτέρα ἐκδοσις βελτιωμένη. Θεσσαλονίκη (Κέντρον Βυζαντινῶν Ἑρευνῶν) 1974, (Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα καὶ Μελέται, 12), σῆμα 8ον, σσ. XV+387.

Ἡ δευτέρα ἐκδοσις τῆς ἐργασίας αὐτῆς εἶναι βελτιωμένη ὅσον ἀφορᾷ εἰς τὰ πορίσματα τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ 1934 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν γενομένων σχετικῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν ἐρευνῶν καὶ ἰδίως εἰς τὴν σχέσιν τῆς ἑλληνικῆς γραφῆς πρὸς τὴν τῆς μινω-μυκηναϊκῆς καὶ δὴ μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ 1951—1952 ἀποκρυπτογράφησιν καὶ ἀνάγνωσιν τῆς μινωϊκῆς-μυκηναϊκῆς γραμμικῆς γραφῆς Β ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος Michael Ventris ἐν συνεργασίᾳ μετὰ τοῦ γλωσσολόγου καθηγητοῦ John Chadwick καὶ κατόπιν ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐπιστημόνων.

Ἡ σύλληψις τοῦ θέματος, ἡ διάταξις τῆς ὕλης, ἡ δομὴ, ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ τῆς μελέτης αὐτῆς εἶναι μεθοδική, συστηματικὴ, ἐπιτυχής. Ἀποτελεῖται ἀπὸ δύο προλόγους, τῆς πρώτης καὶ τῆς δευτέρας ἐκδόσεως, εἰσαγωγὴν, κύριον μέρος καὶ δύο παααρτήματα.

Μετὰ τὴν εἰσαγωγὴν, εἰς τὴν ὁποίαν πραγματεύεται τοὺς προδρόμους καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς γραφῆς, διερευνᾷ τὴν προέλευσιν τῆς ἑλληνικῆς γραφῆς καὶ τὴν ἐξέλιξιν αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμφανισέως της, ἥτοι ἀπὸ τῆς μινωϊκῆς καὶ μυκηναϊκῆς ἐποχῆς μέχρι τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς, ἐπικρατήσεως καὶ διαδόσεως τῆς τυπογραφίας, ὧς καὶ τὴν διάδοσιν αὐτῆς. Εἰς τὸ Α' παράρτημα ἐκθέτει τὰ περὶ τῶν βραχυγραφιῶν, τῆς ταχυγραφίας ἢ στενογραφίας, τῶν ὑποβοηθητικῶν σημείων τῆς ἀναγνώσεως, τῆς ἀλφαβητικῆς ἀριθμήσεως καὶ τῶν ἀρχικῶν γραμμάτων. Εἰς τὸ Β' παράρτημα ὁμιλεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ τῶν συριστικῶν σάδε καὶ σάμεχ πρὸς συμπλήρωσιν τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν λεχθέντων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς σελίδας 90—93, χωρὶς ὅμως καὶ νὰ ἐξαντλῇ τὸ θέμα. Τὸ τέλος τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ ἐκάστου κεφαλαίου κλείεται μὲ πλουσίαν βιβλιογραφίαν δι' ὅσους ἐπιθυμοῦν εἰδικωτέραν ἐνημέρωσιν.

Εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ βιβλίου παραθέτει σημείωμα περὶ τῶν κατακεχωρισμένων εἰς αὐτὸ 254 εἰκόνων, πίνακα πηγῶν καὶ χειρογράφων, πίνακα λέξεων καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ πίνακα συγγραφέων, τὰ ὅποια καθιστοῦν τὸ ἔργον λίαν εὔχρηστον. Προσ-