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Parliamentary coalitions, an n-person game approach to politics

Part of : Σπουδαί : journal of economics and business ; Vol.62, No.3-4, 2012, pages 16-29
Issue:
Vol.62, No.3-4, 2012
Pages:
16-29
Author:
Abstract:
In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway elections as an example we study the possibility of a required long term coalition in Greece. We potentially suggest which parties could form a coalition by using game theory for those cases, where the choice of one party government is not possible.
Subject:
Subject (LC):
Keywords:
game theory, n-person game, characteristic function, parliamentary coalitions
Notes:
Περιέχει διαγράμματα, πίνακες και βιβλιογραφία
References (1):
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